rather than civil service exams and rational political ethics to temper the absolute monarchy.
We see the book's first, and explicit goal, most clearly in the conclusion, where Vogel highlights the five transformations of the Deng Xiaoping era-all of which counter the popular image of China as dictatorial and dangerous. The first is the transition from a Sinocentric stance in foreign relations to participation in current world organizations as simply a nation-state (albeit a very important one). The second is the movement from a revolutionary party led by an unpredictable charismatic leader and disruptive national campaigns to a ruling party led by teams of party managers in an orderly system of delegation and supervision. The third is the shift from a bureaucracy in which position is determined by revolutionary experience, or "redness" loyalty, to one in which position is determined by merit, particularly civil service exams and performance reviews. The fourth is "the transition from a predominantly rural to a predominantly urban society and the spread of a common national culture" during Deng's general management, which "are among the most fundamental changes that have occurred in Chinese society since the country's unification in 221 BC" (706) . And the fifth is the transformation from state plan economic dysfunction to the "Wild East" market dynamism that Vogel compares favorably to the dynamism, lack of consumer protection, and egregious abuse of labor in America's Progressive Era a century ago-suggesting a common path and a future of social legislation to parallel those of twentieth-century America. Vogel does not make the mistake of painting China as "more like us" (the trope, and title, of James Fallows's thoughtful critique of American misunderstandings of Japan in 1990), but he does paint Deng's China and China today as recognizably human, modern, and intelligent, albeit with very different social and political characteristics that are unavoidable due to the structural inheritance and social experience of leaders and populace alike chronicled in the seven hundred pages of detail in this book. This picture is clear and points to the second, and implicit, goal of the book: Don't try to change China. Don't waste time chiding or denouncing aspects of China you (the American leader to whom this book is addressed) don't like or think voters don't like. Pursue American ideals and interests pragmatically, based on an appreciation of the system, its key players, and the history that informs those players' practices and assumptions. This mentality puts Vogel squarely in the camp of John King Fairbank and the pragmatic China policy he first articulated in his long-lived text The United States and China, originally published in 1948. Vogel was not Fairbank's student at Harvard, though Fairbank played a role in recruiting Vogel to the study of Asia, both Japan and China. Whether or not Vogel was influenced by Fairbank's pragmatic approach to China (and the two men had their differences over the years), that is the approach he takes. This approach is more likely attributable to the fact that Vogel falls into a broader circle of academics and public intellectuals-the Harvard advisers to American presidential administrations. This calls to mind the truism in intellectual history, nicely articulated by J.C. William James, among others-developed the idea of pragmatism out of the ashes of the Civil War. In that conflict they saw an ideology, and a good one that they supported-abolitionismdrive their country and their families and neighbors into a fratricidal slaughter that marked them for life. In the several intellectual careers that Menand chronicles, American pragmatism in general and social science professionalism in particular, with its hallmark toleration of difference and skepticism toward all propositions, developed out of the moral commitment "that ideas should not become ideologies-either justifying the status quo, or dictating some transcendental imperative for renouncing it" (xii). We see this in the historiographical relativism of the "new Dream (1995) . Madsen, also a sociologist, reviews the history of China studies from the late 1950s and concludes that much of our work on China is really part of a conversation about the nature of democracy in America, particularly the enduring tension between the goals of community life and individual freedoms. The "heat" in our academic and public debates on China comes from these underlying concerns. From Madsen's analysis, we can see that Vogel is very much a participant in this Janus-faced conversation, but Perry Anderson is too. I think Perry Anderson would agree that he is an intellectual organic to the progressive movement.
Levenson in his book
Thus we can accept that Vogel tells a story that makes sense to his community, as in fact we all do. Vogel's community of pragmatic political advisers in what might be called the current establishment all love it-from those at The Economist [http://www.economist.com/ node/21533354] to most major newspaper reviewers. Those who are committed to keeping human rights front and center in policy debates, and those who doubt the felicity of serving as advisers to the United States or other nation-states that support the current neoliberal order, or who fail to see the practicality of turning a blind eye to the abuses of the system Deng Xiaoping managed, do not love it.
That Vogel, a sociologist, has chosen political biography, and with such a keen eye to contextual detail, changing contexts, a sea of personalities and contingent events-the stuff of behavior, or that of his senior colleagues or of the system he helped revive, is another matter-to be judged on a case-by-case basis. This points to the second half of any critical engagement.
Starting from bite-sized examples, the critical reader will have to dig deeper, but with a question in mind. In my case, I found myself going back to chapter 13, "Deng's Art of Governing," which is much more grounded in Deng's context and describes virtues considerably at variance with chapter 24's general conclusions. In chapter 13, Deng is presented not as "general manager" but as "commanding general," with virtues such as "speak and act with authority," "defend the Party," "keep a firm grip on the military," and "avoid taking blame," as well as several good management skills (377, . Further reflections (or class discussion) Given the concerns of some reviews that Vogel "goes easy on Deng" (and I am inclined to agree), it is reassuring to see in the body of the book that Vogel does not go easy on the system and the political intrigue in China over these years. One does not have to read the angry denunciations of Chang and Halliday to see how bad things were (for politically active people) in Mao's later years. The early chapters of Deng's "tortuous road" back from political oblivion in the early 1970s give a chilling picture of Mao's heartless ways.
We all write with our particular purposes and perspectives, and if we are eloquent we might hope to be persuasive. However, scholarship is designed to temper our motivations so that we may deliver something of use to others beyond our parochial concerns. Vogel's long study of Deng Xiaoping succeeds in both respects.
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